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This Note explores various national and New York civil rights statutes that may be used to combat 
abusive police tactics in New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”) buildings.  This Note 
begins by providing a backdrop on how NYCHA buildings are policed in New York City and a 
description on how vertical patrols are conducted in NYCHA buildings.  Additionally, this Note 
will trace the origin of police presence in NYCHA buildings.  In the course of providing an overview 
of policing in NYCHA buildings, the Note will examine some of the legal challenges that have been 
made to challenge vertical patrols and aggressive police tactics in New York City.  Ultimately, this 
Note will propose that in challenging the New York Police Department’s (“NYPD”) vertical patrols 
and policing in NYCHA buildings, residents should look to § 3617 of the Fair Housing Act and 
New York State and City Human Rights Laws.  
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On November 21, 2014, Akai Gurley was fatally shot on the seventh floor of the Louis Pink Housing 
projects in Brooklyn, New York.1  As Gurley and his girlfriend exited their apartment and entered the stairwell, 
two New York City police officers were conducting a vertical patrol inside the building.2  As the officers entered 
the dimly lit stairwell, one of the officers, patrolling with his gun drawn, fired his gun and killed Gurley.3  
Gurley’s death is not the first shooting of an unarmed Black man in a New York City Housing Authority 
(“NYCHA”) residence.  In 2004, nineteen-year-old Timothy Stansbury, Jr. was shot on the roof of a NYCHA 
building in the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York.4  Ten years prior to the death of 
Stansbury, thirteen-year-old Nicholas Heyward was murdered while playing “cops and robbers” with friends in 
the hallway of the Gowanus Houses in Brooklyn, New York.  An officer on a vertical patrol mistook the clicking 
of Heyward’s orange plastic toy cork gun, and fired a shot at Heyward, which led to his death that same day.5  
In all three of these unfortunate shootings, the police on duty were conducting vertical patrols in 
NYCHA residences.  During vertical patrols, officers of the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) conduct 
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Houk for the guidance and insight she provided during the process of writing this Note.  The author would also like to 
thank Professor Olatunde Johnson, for teaching the Housing Discrimination course in conjunction with Professor Houk 
that first exposed her to important issues within housing discrimination and the various tools that are being applied to 
combat them.  Lastly, the author would like to thank the staff of the Columbia Journal of Race and Law for their invaluable 
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1 Christopher Mathais, NYPD Officer Shoots and Kills Unarmed Man in Brooklyn, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/21/akai-gurley-nypd-shooting-dead_n_6199428.html. On February 
10, 2015, Peter Liang, the officer that shot Gurley, was indicted by a grand jury on manslaughter, assault, and other criminal 
charges.  Chris Fuchs, Former NYPD Cop Peter Liang’s Guilty Verdict Leaves a Community Divided, NBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/former-nypd-cop-peter-liang-s-guilty-verdict-leaves-community-
n518056. 
2 Id.  
3  Ray Sanchez, Police: N.Y. Officer Fatally Shoots ‘Innocent’ Unarmed Man, CNN NEWS (Dec. 8, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/21/us/new-york-police-shooting/. 
4 Robert D. McFadden & Ian Urbina, Fatal Shooting Not Justified, The Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/25/nyregion/fatal-shooting-not-justified-the-police-say.html. Timothy Stansbury Jr. 
was one of twenty-five people to attend a birthday party for a teenage neighbor in a fourth-floor flat at 395 Lexington 
Avenue.  At 1:30 a.m., Stansbury, who was the D.J., went next door to his friend’s apartment to obtain more music. After 
picking up several CDs, Stansbury, along with several friends, climbed the apartment’s stairs to the roof to return to the 
party.  When Stansbury opened the door to the roof, he was shot and killed.  Id.  
5 NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON 
POLICE INTERACTIONS WITH PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS IN NEW YORK CITY 6 (2008), http://www.nylpi.org/wp-
content/uploads/bsk-pdf-manager/170_2008_COPP_REPORT_WITH_NEW_COVER.PDF (last visited Apr. 17, 
2016).  
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a top-down sweep, sometimes with their weapons drawn as they survey and patrol the premises of NYCHA 
buildings.6  Section 212-59 of the NYPD Patrol Guide, effective July 1, 2013, defines vertical patrolling as: 
 
Tactically planned patrol[s] of the interior hallways, stairways and rooftops of 
multiple dwelling buildings [. . .] where officers are to conduct inspections of 
roof landing, elevator rooms and any other installations [. . .] Patrol each floor, 
staircase and hallway within the building from the top floor to the ground 
floor [. . .] be alert for persons who may be engaged in criminal activity, 
including potential trespassers.7 
 
These patrols are aimed at assisting NYCHA in enforcing its rules, minimizing criminal activity, and providing 
a safe environment for residents and their guests.8  
 
Despite their intended purpose, there have been longstanding concerns about the manner in which 
police conduct vertical patrols in communities of color9 across New York City, and specifically, NYCHA 
buildings.  Vertical patrols and aggressive policing tactics have become a chronic nuisance for people of color 
living in NYCHA housing, where residents complain daily of discourtesy, constant harassment, and 
inappropriate stops by police officers.10  The presence of the NYPD in NYCHA buildings has not only brought 
unwelcome interactions and attention from police officers, but it has also brought many cases of frivolous 
arrests of residents and their guests for trespassing.11 
 
This Note argues that in challenging the discriminatory manner in which the NYPD utilizes vertical 
patrols and aggressive policing procedures in NYCHA buildings, individuals should look to national and local 
civil rights statutes, namely the Fair Housing Act, and New York State and City human rights laws.  Bringing 
claims under these laws has been largely unexplored in the context of vertical patrolling, and in the context of 
abusive police tactics nationwide.  This Note seeks to shed light on how these statutes may serve as alternative 
courses of action in combatting this growing problem facing people of color living in NYCHA housing.  
 
Part II of this Note details the history of police presence in NYCHA housing and provides background 
on the patterns of vertical patrolling and aggressive police tactics in these buildings.  Part III will examine recent 
litigation on this issue and discuss some of the limitations of the current legal tactics in combatting police 
misconduct and aggressive policing tactics in minority communities.  The analysis in Part III will largely build 
on Davis v. City of New York, a class action lawsuit filed against the City of New York and NYCHA.12  Although 
a settlement among the parties in Davis has been reached, this case raises important legal questions and issues 
that this Note seeks to address.  Finally, Part IV advocates for the use of various civil rights statutes to challenge 
the discriminatory manner in which vertical patrols are used in NYCHA housing.  This section will focus on § 






                                                
6 Id. at 4–5.  
7 See NYPD, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PATROL GUIDE §§ 212-59, 212-60 (2013).  
8 Id.  
9 For the purposes of this Note, “communities of color” and “people of color” will be used to describe Black 
and Latino communities in New York City.  
10 See Clair MacDougall, NYPD Sued Over Housing Project: Vertical Patrols, HUFFINGTON POST (July 15, 2010), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/clair-macdougall/nypd-sued-over-housing-pr_b_648259.html.  
11 See Fagan Declaration for Plaintiff at 1, Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
12 Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) [hereinafter Fagan Declaration].  
13 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).  
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II. HISTORY OF SECURITY AND POLICE SERVICES IN NYCHA HOUSING 
 
The first NYCHA buildings were constructed in 1934.14  Just five years later, the State of New York 
passed the Public Housing Law of 1939, which led to the country’s first subsidized public housing program 
and the construction of hundreds of housing developments for low-income families.15  Today, NYCHA is the 
largest public housing authority in North America.16  The residents of NYCHA are low-income individuals and 
families, composed primarily, but not exclusively, of people of color.17  The NYPD, under an umbrella unit 
known as the “housing bureau,” currently provides police services to NYCHA buildings; however, prior to 
1994, a special housing police force, known as Housing Authority Police Department, patrolled NYCHA 
housing.18  In 1994, the Housing Authority Police Department merged with the NYPD, forming the Housing 
Bureau.19  Today, the NYPD Housing Bureau is responsible for maintaining safety and providing security and 
police services to more than 400,000 residents, employees, and public housing guests throughout New York 
City.20 
A. The Birth Of Vertical Patrolling In NYCHA Housing 
In 1989, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) launched the 
Drug Elimination Program (“DEP”) largely to eliminate drug-related crimes in public housing across the 
nation.21  HUD is responsible for administering federal aid to local housing agencies that manage low-income 
housing.22  In addition, HUD assists in the technical and professional planning, developing, and managing of 
these developments.23  In fulfilling this role, HUD implemented DEP, and sought to strengthen formal and 
informal social control mechanisms in public housing developments through an increase in police presence and 
targeted prosecutions.24  
 
In 1990, NYCHA sought DEP funds from HUD and implemented its local DEP program known as 
Operation Safe Home (“OSH”).25  As part of the OSH policy, vertical patrols were one of the main procedures 
used in buildings with high-level drug crimes.26  During these patrols, OSH teams comprised of five police 
officers and one sergeant would patrol indoor and outdoor areas of NYCHA housing, conducting systematic 
                                                
14 About NYCHA, THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/about/nycha70_timeline.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
15  Id.  
16  Facts about NYCHA, THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/factsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). 
17 NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 5, at 4.  
18 See id.  
19 Id. The NYCHA and the NYPD entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, which required NYCHA to 
pay the city for NYPD police services.  Following the merger, the New York City Police Department Housing Bureau was 
created to provide the security and delivery of police services to individuals using public housing throughout New York 
City.  Id.  
20  Housing Bureau, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/housing_bureau/housing.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). 
21 Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Jan Holland, The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New York City Public 
Housing, 13 GEO. J. POV. L. & POL’Y 415, 423 (2006).  
22  HUD’s Public Housing Program, The United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog (last visited June 2, 2016).  
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 423, 425.  
25 See id. at 417.  
26 Id. at 427.  
2016 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 173 
 
building patrols lasting from several weeks to several months.27  OSH officers also encouraged residents to 
form tenant patrols, providing guidance and training to these resident-led patrols.28  
 
In 1991, the OSH program had forty-eight officers overall, with twelve officers assigned to each 
NYCHA service area.29  By 1994, following the formation of the Housing Bureau, OSH grew to over 800 
officers and nineteen sergeants.30  In 2002, the Bush Administration withdrew funding from OSH; however, 
police presence and vertical patrol practice in NYCHA buildings continues today.31  
B. The Negative Implications Of NYPD’s Vertical Patrol Policy  
Today, during a vertical patrol, NYPD officers systematically check and monitor numerous buildings 
by scanning roof landings, stairwells, and lobbies of various New York City housing projects.32  During the 
sweeps, officers observe and take note of any maintenance or safety issues, and survey the surroundings for 
any criminal activity, which includes trespassing.33  This task generally falls to some of the least experienced 
officers in the Housing Bureau.34  Although the NYPD has praised vertical patrol practices as a tactic that helps 
ensure the safety of NYCHA buildings,35 many have criticized vertical patrols.  Critics blame the tactic for the 
tragic deaths of innocent individuals, as well as the unconstitutional stops, frisks, and arrests of NYCHA 
residents.36  On a routine basis, police have improperly detained or arrested individuals for trespass when they 
had legitimate reasons for being on NYCHA property.  Residents also complain of excessive stop-and-frisk 
detentions during these patrols.37 
 
 A survey conducted at the Thomas Jefferson Houses38 revealed that NYPD officers routinely stopped 
the majority of the residents, as well as their invited guests.39  Forty-one percent of surveyed residents and their 
visitors reported being stopped up to five times per year.  Sixteen percent reported being stopped five to ten 
times per year.  Nineteen percent reported being stopped ten to twenty times per year, and twenty-four percent 
claimed to be stopped more than twenty times per year.40  The majority of the people surveyed reported that 
they were often stopped and asked for identification when they were merely entering or exiting their residence.41  
                                                
27 Id.  
28 HUD’s Public Housing Program, supra note 22.  
29 Id. at 427–28.  NYCHA service areas were administrative units that were very similar to police precincts.  See 
id.  
30 Id.  
31 NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 5, at 4.  After 2002, NYCHA bore the brunt of 
payments to New York City for NYCHA policing. Despite this change, police staffing did not diminish.  Id.  
32  Frequently Asked Questions, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/faq/faq_police.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).   
33 NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 7, at §§ 212-59, 212-60.  
34  See Tina Susman, Fatal New York Police Shooting Stokes New Criticism, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-nyc-shooting-20141123-story.html.  Twenty-seven-year-old Peter Liang, the 
officer responsible for shooting Akai Gurley, was a new police officer on the force. Id.  
35  See Michael Schwirtz, Public Housing Patrols Can Mean Safety or Danger, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/nyregion/housing-patrols-can-mean-safety-or-peril-to-residents.html?_r=0 
(reporting that in a press conference on November 21, 2014, NYPD Commissioner William Bratton contended that 
vertical patrols have served an important role in the NYPD’s ability to police housing projects in New York City).  
36 See id.  The Civilian Review Board received an increase in police misconduct complaints by a magnitude of 
sixty-six percent between 2002 and 2006.  Status Report January-June 2007, NEW YORK CITY CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW 
BD., June 2007, at 11, http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/ccrbsemi_2007_Jan_June.pdf.  
37 Complaint at 2, Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) [hereinafter Davis Complaint]. 
38 The Thomas Jefferson Houses in Manhattan have eighteen buildings, with 1,487 apartment units for an 
estimated 3,729 residents.  See NYCHA Housing Developments: Jefferson Houses, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/developments/manjefferson.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
39 NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 5, at 10.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 11.  
174                                 Dismantling Discrimination in the Stairways and Halls of NYCHA Vol. 6:2 
 
 
Respondents reported stops, searches, arrests, and excessive force as frequent occurrences42 in the Thomas 
Jefferson Houses.  Surveyors found similar results in a survey conducted with residents living at the Walt 
Whitman Houses.43  While some may argue that suspicion likely prompted these alleged stops, residents 
reported being stopped by the same officer on routine vertical patrols, “which indicates that the officers likely 
recognize[d] them as residents of the building, and would have no reason to believe they were trespassing.”44  
Aside from the survey, several cases across New York have corroborated these systematic suspicionless stops, 
where courts have found that police officers detained individuals during vertical patrols when they lacked any 
objectively credible reason for doing so.45 
 
Vertical patrols are also extremely dangerous.  Unlike street patrols, vertical patrols do not occur in an 
open view situation.46  As a consequence, officers are not aware of what they may confront when walking up 
steep flights of steps or turning tight corners in NYCHA buildings.  These patrols often require rookie officers 
to make split-second decisions that can be life threatening to themselves and others.  These dangerous patrols 
have led to the fatal shootings of countless people of color and police officers alike.47 
 
 The manner in which members of the NYPD conduct these patrols is not the only aspect of the policy 
under scrutiny.  Critics assert that the NYPD’s policy overwhelmingly impacts Black and Latino communities.48  
According to an expert report, in 2012, Blacks and Latinos represented over ninety percent of all persons 
stopped in NYCHA buildings.49  The report also found significant racial disparities in the context of trespass 
stops and arrests, even after controlling for crime conditions, patrol strength, socio-economic conditions, and 
other policy-relevant factors.50  
 
Considering that the vast majority of NYCHA residents are people of color, these figures are not 
surprising.  However, the expert report also found that citywide, Blacks and Latinos account for over eighty 
percent of all persons stopped.51  Additionally, there are significantly more total stops and arrests in NYCHA 
public housing sites compared to the immediate surrounding areas.52  These disparities are consistent with many 
findings in the Thomas Jefferson Houses survey.  In the survey, seventy-one percent of individuals who 
                                                
42 Id. at 10.  
43 NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 5, at 12.  Walt Whitman Houses in Brooklyn, NY 
consists of fifteen buildings, with 1,636 apartment units for about 4,276 people.  Thomas Jefferson Houses in Manhattan 
has eighteen buildings, with 1,487 apartment units for an estimated 3,729 residents.  NYCHA Housing Developments: Jefferson 
Houses: Whitman, Walt Houses, NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/developments/bklynwhitmanhouses.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
44 NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 5, at 11.  
45 See People v. Taylor, No. 54639C-2005, 2006 WL 1348745, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 12, 2006) (finding officers 
had no legal basis to approach and request information from defendant); People v. Ventura, 30 Misc. 3d 587, 590, 913 
N.Y.S.2d 543 546 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (finding officer’s initial questioning, search, and arrest during a vertical patrol based 
solely on individual’s presence in the lobby unlawful).  
46 Barry Paddock, NYPD’s ‘Vertical Patrols’ of Housing Project Stairwells Under Criticism After Shooting Death of Unarmed 
Man, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-vertical-
patrols-housing-projects-controversial-article-1.2019696.  
47See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.  In 1988, Officer Anthony McClean was killed after observing a crack 
dealer during a vertical patrol.  In 2012, NYPD officer Brian Groves was shot at close range, but was saved by his bullet-
resistant vest, while patrolling a NYCHA building in the Lower East Side of Manhattan, New York.  Id.  
48 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 3.  
49 Fagan Declaration, supra note 11, at 2.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
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reported being stopped were African American, and twenty-eight percent were Latino.53  Members of the 
NYPD have even corroborated the discriminatory nature of the NYPD’s policing tactics.54  
 
III. REFORMING AND REVISING THE PATROL GUIDE  
 
In 2009, the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) noticed an increase in the number of 
complaints it received from individuals across New York who alleged that they had been improperly stopped 
in and around NYCHA buildings.55  After further investigation, the CCRB met with the NYPD to discuss the 
rise in allegations of improper stops in NYCHA buildings, and proposed a number of recommendations to 
curb the rising number of complaints.56  In response to the CCRB’s recommendations and data, the NYPD 
made several changes to Patrol Guide provisions governing vertical patrols in NYCHA buildings.57  The NYPD 
revised Patrol Guide 212-60, entitled “Interior Vertical Patrol of Housing Authority Buildings,” in an effort to 
provide additional guidance to police officers patrolling NYCHA properties.58  
 
A year later, Interim Order Number 23, a program targeted at “assist[ing] the Housing Authority in 
enforcing its rules, limiting criminal activity, providing a safe and secure environment, and ensuring the 
habitability of its residential buildings for Housing Authority residents and their guests by performing interior 
vertical patrols,”59 replaced Patrol Guide 212-60.  Along with clearer guidelines, Interim Order Number 23 
included a ninety-minute training curriculum that sought to explain: 1) the purpose of interior vertical patrols 
within NYCHA buildings; 2) the importance of proper interactions between officers and NYCHA residents; 
and 3) a full description of the new changes in the NYPD’s policy in conducting interior vertical patrols of 
housing authority buildings.60  The new order was implemented in 2010, and since its implementation, over 
ninety percent of the targeted NYPD personnel have been trained.61  
 
At the time changes to the NYPD’s vertical patrolling policies were contemplated, plaintiffs brought 
three lawsuits62 in federal court challenging the NYPD’s discriminatory stop and frisk policy in NYCHA 
housing, private buildings, and various communities of color across New York City.  In 2008, a class of minority 
New York City residents filed a complaint against New York City challenging the NYPD’s practice of racial 
profiling, alleging that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practices were unconstitutional.63  Four years later, a class of 
minority citizens challenged the NYPD’s stop-and frisk practices in thousands of private apartment buildings 
                                                
53 NEW YORK LAWYERS FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 5, at 12.  
54  See Jean Shin, Officer Accuses NYPD of Racial Profiling, CNN NEWS (Dec. 31, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/31/officer.racial.profiling/.  (Sergeant McReynolds alleged he was a victim of 
racial profiling when police officers stopped him during a vertical sweep in his girlfriend’s apartment building in Bronx). 
See also Michelle Conlin, Off Duty, Black Cops in New York Feel Threat from Fellow Police, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/23/us-usa-police-nypd-race-insight-idUSKBN0K11EV20141223. (“Reuters 
interviewed [twenty-five] African American male officers on the NYPD, [fifteen] of whom are retired and [ten] of whom 
are still serving.  All but one said that, when off duty and out of uniform, they had been victims of racial profiling” in 
various contexts).  
55 See Press Release, Civilian Complaint Review Bd., Based on CCRB Recommendation, NYPD Retrains Officers 
Who Patrol NYCHA Buildings (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/Police_Retraining_10_27_2010.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
56 Id. (recommending retraining of NYPD officers, specifically emphasizing that stops in NYCHA buildings 
require reasonable suspicion).  
57 Id. at 2.  
58 Davis v. City of New York, 812 F. Supp. 2d 333, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
59 Id. at 336.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 336–37.  
62 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 
478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
63 Floyd, 283 F.R.D. 153.  
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across New York City.64  Lastly, in Davis v. City of New York, a group comprised of NYCHA residents and 
visitors filed suit against the City of New York and NYCHA challenging the NYPD’s practice of unlawful stops 
and arrests in NYCHA buildings.65  In the complaint, the class challenged the NYPD’s implementation of the 
vertical patrol and trespass arrest policy, alleging it resulted in a pattern and practice of illegal stops, seizures, 
questioning, searches, and false arrests.66  
  
As this Note aims to examine the potential remedial tools available to residents of NYCHA buildings, 
it will focus exclusively on Davis.  Despite the NYPD’s 2009 vertical patrol policy reform, which occurred in 
the backdrop of Davis, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held in a summary judgment proceeding on July 5, 2011 that the City failed to establish the new 
police patrol guide, and that the patrol training curriculum had rendered moot the Plaintiffs’ §1983 municipal67 
liability claim for equitable relief.  Furthermore, Judge Scheindlin stated that the efficacy of the new policy guide 
and training curriculum were both unknown and disputed.68 
 
 Since Judge Scheindlin’s opinion, the New York Civilian Complaint Review Board has further 
reviewed and analyzed trespass-related complaints filed by tenants of NYCHA housing.69  In its second review 
during a sixteen-month span, the agency found an overall decrease in the number of improper stop and question 
complaints, from seventy-six complaints in the agency’s 2010 study to fifty-nine in its 2012 study.70  However, 
despite the decrease in complaints, the CCRB analysis showed a large increase in the substantiation rate of 
complaints.71  Though the CCRB is still investigating data on complaints of police misconduct in NYCHA 
buildings, the statistics released in the monthly board meeting demonstrate that the NYPD’s patrolling reform 
hasn’t done enough to stop the practice of improper trespassing stops in NYCHA buildings.  
A. Legal Tools With Limitations 
To better understand the utility of housing laws in challenging vertical patrols and the NYPD’s 
discriminatory policing practices, it is important to discuss Davis, a class action suit challenging these practices.  
On August 30, 2013, Judge Scheindlin granted class certification in Davis.72  The plaintiff class consisted of two 
subclasses, including the “Arrested Plaintiffs” and the “Resident Plaintiffs.”73   The “Arrested Plaintiffs” 
consisted of Black and Latino NYCHA residents and guests who have been, and who then were, at risk of 
being stopped, seized, questioned, searched or falsely arrested for trespass without any probable cause in or 
around NYCHA buildings.74  The “Resident Plaintiffs” subclass consisted of Black and Latino NYCHA 
residents who live in buildings subject to the NYPD’s vertical patrol policy and trespass arrest practices.75 
 
                                                
64 Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478.  
65 Case: Davis v. City of New York, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/case/davis-vs-city-
new-york (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
66 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 408.  
67 Davis, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 333.  
68 Id. at 339–40.  
69 Memorandum from Bd. Members of Civilian Complaint Review Bd. to Marcos Soler & Denis McCormick 
(May 31, 2013), http://home2.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/patrolled_housing_memo.pdf.  
70 Id. at 2.  
71 Id.  
72 Federal Judge Grants Class Certification in Case Challenging Discriminatory Use of Stop-and-Arrests for Trespass in New 
York City’s Public Housing, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/update/federal-judge-grants-
class-certification-case-challenging-discriminatory-use-stops-and-arrest (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
73 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 5. Rule 23(c)(5) of the FRCP authorizes dividing a class into subclasses that 
are each treated as a class under Rule 23 when appropriate.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(5); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  
74 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 6.  
75 Id.  
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 In the Davis complaint, residents and visitors charged the City of New York and NYCHA with 
violating their Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 
and 1968, the Fair Housing Act, the United States Housing Act, and laws of the State of New York and New 
York City.76  Though the case was not fully litigated,77 this section will discuss the utility and limitations of two 
of the claims brought in Davis: § 3604(b) and § 1983 claims.  In most lawsuits challenging police-officer 
misconduct, plaintiffs allege a violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.78  Furthermore, § 3604(b) 
of the Fair Housing Act, a largely unused authority, has been the topic of recent scholarship in the context of 
challenging aggressive police enforcement tactics nationwide.79 
 
Examining challenges under these two provisions will not only provide a useful understanding of how 
individuals have challenged police misconduct, but also will demonstrate the usefulness of exploring new tactics 
under various civil rights laws.  Following a discussion of these two provisions, this Note will provide a broad 
overview of the proposed preliminary settlement terms in Davis.  
 
1. Section 1983 And Monell Claims 
 
Section 1983 allows individuals to bring a private cause of action for violations of their constitutional 
rights against an actor acting under the color of state law.80  Section 1983 is the most frequently used basis for 
federal police misconduct actions against state or local officers.81  Most lawsuits charging a police officer with 
misconduct will also include the municipality as a co-defendant, and in some cases supervisory personnel as 
well.82  However, holding municipalities liable for the unconstitutional acts of one of its officials remains 
difficult in actions for damages under § 1983.83  In Davis, the class of residents brought § 1983 claims against 
NYCHA and the City of New York.84  
 
In Monell v. New York City Department of School Services,85 the United States Supreme Court held that under 
certain circumstances a local government may be considered a person or actor, rendering it subject to suit under 
§ 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.86  Under a Monell claim, plaintiffs must prove that actions pursuant 
to official municipal policy caused the alleged constitutional violation.87  One method of establishing municipal 
                                                
76 Id. at 1.  
77 The parties reached a preliminary settlement on January 7, 2015.  See Preliminary Settlement Reached in Federal Class 
Action Lawsuit Challenging Police Practices in NYC Public Housing: Major NYPD Reforms to be Implemented in Court-Ordered 
Monitoring Process, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/update/preliminary-settlement-reached-
federal-class-action-lawsuit-challenging-police-practices-nyc- (last visited Apr. 17, 2016). See infra pp. 18–20.  
78 See Jim T. Priest & Reggie N. Whitten, Defense of a Police Misconduct Suit, 38 AM. JUR. TRIALS 493 (2016) (originally 
published in 1989).  
79 See Roberto Concepción, Jr., The Untapped Potential of the Fair Housing Act in Addressing Aggressive Enforcement of 
“Walking While Black or Brown”, 17 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 383, 385–86 (2014).  
80 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).  
81 Lisa D. Hawke, Municipal Liability and Respondeat Superior: An Empirical Study and Analysis, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 831, 832 (2005).  
82 38 Am. Jur. Trials 493.  Although a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat 
superior, persons can allege that decision of municipal policy maker, or approval from municipal decision maker, resulted 
in the police conduct in question. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of St. Louis v. 
Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988).  
83 Id. (citing SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 
1983 1-4 (4th ed. 2002)).  
84 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 2.  
85 Monell v. New York City Dep’t of School Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
86 Id. at 690 (“Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 compels the conclusion that 
Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 
applies.”).  
87 Id. at 691.  
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liability under Monell is showing that there is a deliberate indifference on the part of high-level officials.88  This 
standard is stringent, and in the Second Circuit, plaintiffs are required to show that the policymakers’ inaction 
or indifference was not just the result of mere negligence, but also a conscious choice.89  This burdensome 
standard severely limits the liability of municipalities for unlawful police conduct.  Proving conscious choice is 
extremely difficult for plaintiffs, which often results in fewer victorious claims under § 1983.90 
 
In many cases, municipalities indemnify officers if the alleged misconduct is within the line of duty.91  
Indemnifying particular municipal officers generally fails to correct policies or patterns of abuse within a police 
unit, providing no incentive for officers not indemnified in the matter to correct their misconduct.92  Even if a 
plaintiff is able to prove a constitutional violation under § 1983, a defendant officer may still avoid liability by 
proving that he or she acted with a reasonable and good faith belief that the conduct in question was legal.93  
In practice, judges almost always find that an officer acted in good faith.94 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, § 1983 plaintiffs are hampered by evidentiary and procedural 
difficulties, corroboration problems, the police “code of silence,” and discovery battles to access confidential 
police documents.95  Despite many limitations and criticisms against § 1983 claims, they remain an important 
tool for challenging police misconduct; however, plaintiffs may find greater utility under the civil rights statutes 
discussed later in this Note.  
 
2. Section 3604(b) Claims Under The Fair Housing Act  
 
In Davis, the Plaintiffs alleged that the City of New York, along with NYCHA, violated the rights of 
Resident-Plaintiffs and members of the class under the FHA.96  The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants 
discriminated on the basis of race or national origin in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental agreements, 
or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with the rental of a dwelling in violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3604(b).97 
Recent scholarship has discussed the utility of using § 3604(b) of the FHA as a means of challenging 
aggressive policing;98 however, plaintiffs may find it particularly difficult to use this tactic to challenge vertical 
patrols and aggressive policing.  One of the potential shortcomings is a lack of clarity regarding how the section 
applies to conduct occurring after the initial rental or sale of a dwelling when proof of constructive or actual 
eviction is absent.  Circuit courts are split in determining whether the provision prohibits only discrimination 
                                                
88 Davis v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“One way to establish the existence of 
a municipal policy is through a showing of ‘deliberate indifference’ by high-level officials.”).  
89 Id.  
90 See Hawke, supra note 81, at 849 (“Many of the city attorneys reasoned that the current doctrine makes it 
difficult for a plaintiff to prove a case against the city, resulting in fewer victorious claims for plaintiffs.”).  
91 Revisiting Who is Guarding the Guardians, Chapter 5: Remedies and Legal Developments, UNITED STATES COMM’N ON 
CIVIL RIGHTS, http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/guard/ch5.htm#_ftnref13 (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
92 Concepción, supra note79, at 391–92.  
93 See Street v. Cherba, 662 F.2d 1037, 1039 (4th Cir. 1981) (“[I]t is well-established that a police officer is entitled 
to qualified immunity from an assessment of damages against him if he acted with a reasonable and good faith belief that 
he had acted lawfully.”).  See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1971) (“[I]t is a valid 
defense [. . .] to allege and prove that the federal agent or other federal police officer acted in the matter complained of in 
good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search and in the necessity for carrying out the 
arrest and search in the way the arrest was made and the search was conducted.”).  
94 Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 156 (1998).  
95 Id. at 155.  
96 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 44.  
97 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 44.  
98 See, e.g., Concepción, supra note 79, at 397.  
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prior to and at the time of the sale or initial rental, or if the provision applies to conduct after acquisition or 
during the term of the lease.99  Section 3604 of the FHA Act states that: 
 
To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in 
connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or 
national origin.100 
 
The root of this disagreement lies in conflicting statutory interpretation, namely the meaning of “therewith” in 
the phrase “in connection therewith.”101  
 
One of the competing interpretations of this language is that the word “therewith” solely references 
the “sale or rental of a dwelling” clause.  Thus, any discriminatory act, including the provision of police services 
after an individual has purchased or rented his or her dwelling, would fall outside of the scope of the 
provision.102  Another interpretation is that the language refers to a dwelling generally, whereby a claim 
challenging police services following an acquisition or rental would fall within the scope of § 3604(b).103  
Though the latter interpretation of the Act would enable a plaintiff challenging vertical patrols to state a 
cognizable claim under § 3406(b), many courts have adopted the narrower interpretation.104  This narrow 
reading could prevent plaintiffs from bringing claims challenging discriminatory police services in NYCHA 
because the conduct alleged would have occurred “post-acquisition.”  In a summary judgment motion in Davis, 
Judge Scheindlin held that § 3604(b) is best understood to prohibit post- and pre-acquisition discrimination in 
the provision of housing related services.105  While Judge Scheindlin’s decision provided insight into how the 
Davis Court viewed the plaintiffs’ claims, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not 
addressed this issue.106 
 
Despite the lack of clarity on this issue, a plaintiff bringing a claim in the rental context may still have 
a strong claim under § 3604(b).  In Richards v. Bono, the Court held that the narrow reading of § 3604(b) did not 
extend to cases of post-acquisition rental discrimination because unlike a sale, a rental arrangement involved an 
ongoing relationship between a landlord and tenant, whereby the landlord typically retains obligations such as 
the duty to make repairs or provide services and facilities.107  Though no other courts have adopted this rationale 
when applying § 3604(b) to post-acquisition claims, Richards may serve as persuasive authority for resident-
plaintiffs in NYCHA housing, who as tenants have an ongoing relationship with NYCHA as their landlord.  
 
While disagreements regarding § 3604(b)’s applicability to post-acquisition claims may be an issue of 
concern for future plaintiffs challenging vertical patrolling, most courts have held that this subsection applies 
to housing-related services generally provided by governmental units, such as police and fire protection or 
                                                
99 Compare Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745-6 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the law does not prohibit post-
acquisition discrimination unless there has been constructive eviction), with Committee Concerning Cmty. Improvement 
v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 711 (9th Cir. 2009).  See also Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(declaring Fair Housing Act can reach post-acquisition-discrimination).  
100 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1988).  
101 Benjamin A. Schepis, Making the Fair Housing Act More Fair: Permitting Section 3604(b) to Provide Relief for Post-
Occupancy Discrimination in the Provision of Municipal Services—A Historical View, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 411, 425 (2010) (citing 
Lopez v. City of Dallas, No. 3:03-CV-2223-M, 20004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18220, at *21–22 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2004)).  
102 See id.  
103 Id.  
104  See Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the city’s allegedly racially 
discriminatory failure to prevent illegal dumping in predominantly African American neighborhoods across Dallas was not 
connected to sale or rental of any dwelling, and thus was not a cognizable claim under § 3604(b) of the FHA).  See 
also Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004). 
105 Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
106 Id. at 435.  
107 Richards v. Bono, No. 5:04-CV484-OC-10GRJ, 2005 WL 1065141, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005).  
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garbage collection.108  Additionally, this interpretation has been extended not only to cases where plaintiffs have 
alleged a refusal to provide police protection,109 but also in instances where plaintiffs have alleged abusive police 
services.110  Despite the circuit split, § 3604(b) remains an important tool to consider in the effort to combat 
aggressive policing policies in New York City and across the nation.  
B. A Preliminary Settlement  
On January 7, 2015, both parties to the Davis litigation announced that they reached a preliminary 
settlement agreement to resolve the five-year-old federal class-action suit.111  Though the parties have not 
released a detailed settlement agreement, the preliminary summary of the settlement includes a revision of the 
NYPD’s patrol guide 212-60.112  The revisions include an instruction to officers on how to conduct vertical 
patrols, a requirement that NYPD officers must complete “Trespass Crime Fact Sheets” after making arrests 
in or around NYCHA residences, and greater clarification on procedures an officer must follow when he or 
she observes criminal and non-criminal violations.113  Additionally, the NYPD has agreed to comply with the 
Court-ordered monitoring process in the Floyd v. City of New York litigation.114  
 
An ineffective settlement reached by parties in Daniels v. City of New York115 prompted the Floyd 
litigation.116  Floyd was a case which challenged the NYPD’s policy and practice of stopping-and-frisking people 
of color without reasonable suspicion, as required by the Fourth Amendment.  In Daniels, the parties reached 
a settlement in 2003 that required retraining of police and court monitoring; however, updated data revealed 
that there was a demonstrable increase in stop-and-frisks from 2002 to 2006, including extreme disparities in 
“stop” rates based on race, ethnicity, or national origin.117  The settlement in Daniels led to few changes in the 
manner in which the NYPD conducted stop-and frisks, and as mentioned above, failure to fully comply with 
the consent decree and the increase in unconstitutional stop-and-frisks ultimately prompted the Center for 
Constitutional Rights to file Floyd, a class action against the NYPD just five years after the initial settlement. 
 
Though the Davis settlement is surely a step in the right direction, it is unclear whether this agreement 
can erase the deeply entrenched legacy of aggressive policing in and around NYCHA buildings.  The Daniels 
settlement demonstrates that extensive court monitoring and police retraining may not remedy improper police 
tactics that target individuals of color.  Furthermore, this settlement does not rid NYCHA of vertical policing, 
but merely retrains and clarifies permissible and impermissible procedures that may be used during vertical 
                                                
108 Southend Neighborhood Imp. Ass’n v. St. Clair Cnty., 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984).  
109 See The Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690 699 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(Plaintiffs brought a claim regarding law enforcement response time).  
110 See Concepción, supra note 79, at 397.  See Doe v. County of Kankakee, No. 03 C8786, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12740, at *14–17 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2004) (plaintiffs alleged that the city and county selectively applied law enforcement 
tactics to the detriment of the complex’s predominately African American residents).  
111 Preliminary Settlement Reached in Federal Class Action Lawsuit Challenging Police Practices in NYC Public Housing; Major 
NYPD Reforms to be Implemented in Court-Ordered Monitoring Process, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 
http://www.naacpldf.org/update/preliminary-settlement-reached-federal-class-action-lawsuit-challenging-police-
practices-nyc (last visited Apr. 17, 2016).  
112 Id. 
113 See Preliminary Settlement at 1, Davis v. City of New York, DOCKET NO. 1:10-CV-00699 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
28, 2010).  
114 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See supra text accompanying notes 50–
58.  
115 Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99-1695 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  
116 Id.  
117 Id. (citing Report: Racial Disparity in NYPD Stop and Frisks, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Feb. 3, 
2009), http://ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/publications/report-racial-disparity-nypd-stop-and-
frisks).  
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patrols, a revision allegedly made in 2010 that had little impact on the substantiation of complaints of police 
misconduct.118  
 
Considering the continued disparities in stop-and-frisk arrests and the dramatic impact this policy, 
along with vertical patrols, continues to have on Black and Latino residents in NYCHA buildings, it is clear 
that the culture of violence and discriminatory nature of these policies are deeply entrenched and not limited 
to misconduct of just a few officers.  Until these policies are removed, or alternative policing models are 
implemented, the housing rights of individuals in NYCHA buildings will likely continue to be violated.  For 
this reason, individuals should consider utilizing housing laws to challenge racialized policing. 
 
IV. NEW REMEDIES 
 
Though both parties have reached a preliminary settlement regarding this issue, the Davis settlement 
does not undermine this Note’s proposed remedies or the private right of action they may offer if proposed 
reforms are not effective.  Additionally, many of the proposed civil rights and housing law claims may provide 
a useful means of thinking about remedying aggressive police tactics in communities of color outside New York 
State.  
 
The Fair Housing Act,119 enacted by Congress in 1968, the New York State Human Rights Law,120 and 
the New York City Human Rights Law121 all provide alternative causes of action to NYCHA residents who 
encounter discrimination during their tenancy.  All three laws are similarly structured and provide both private 
and administrative mechanisms to investigate and challenge alleged acts of discrimination.  Despite the 
similarities, these three statutes vary in coverage and enforcement procedure.  This section will provide 
background information and discuss the practical utility of these three laws in addressing future problems in 
public housing regarding vertical patrolling both in New York City and across the nation.  
A. Section 3617 Of The Fair Housing Act 
 On April 11, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 into law.122  The 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 expanded previous protections against discrimination and created a new prohibition 
against discrimination in the context of housing.123  Title VIII of the Act, also known as the Fair Housing Act, 
prohibited discrimination concerning the sale, rental, and financing of housing based on race, color, religion, 
national origin, or sex.  Congress amended the law in 1988, extending protections to handicap and family 
status.124 
 
There are a number of FHA provisions that seek to remedy discrimination in varying housing contexts; 
however, for the purposes of this Note, this section will discuss the utility of 42 U.S.C. § 3617.  Section 3617 
of the FHA states that:  
 
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any 
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised 
or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person 
                                                
118 See supra text accompanying notes 60–64.  
119 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1968).  
120 N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-301 et seq. (McKinney 1974).  
121 N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8-101 et seq. (2015).  
122  History of Fair Housing, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2016).  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
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in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by § 3603, 
3604, 3605, or 3606 [of the FHA].125  
 
Under the terms of § 3617, two distinct groups are protected.126  The provision protects members of a protected 
class from coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference in the exercise or enjoyment of their Fair Housing 
Act rights.127  Additionally, § 3617 protects those who aid or encourage protected class members in the exercise 
or enjoyment of fair housing rights.128  
 
Section 3617 of the FHA has been the topic of much debate in scholarship and among courts seeking 
to discern whether a cause of action under § 3617 can exist independent of a claim under § 3604, § 3605, or § 
3606.129  The language of § 3617 may suggest that for a § 3617 claim to be valid, a plaintiff must possess a 
separate and valid claim under §§ 3603-06 of the statute.  For example, an individual who is threatened, 
intimidated, or harassed in relation to the occupation of his home would presumably only have a cause of action 
under § 3617 if it is also found that he was denied access to his home because of his race in violation of 
§ 3604(a).130   
 
In Stackhouse v. DeSitter,131 a district court held that an individual may bring a § 3617 claim absent a 
violation of § 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606.132  In Stackhouse, the Plaintiff, a Black resident who had moved in to a 
predominately White neighborhood, alleged that his White neighbor had interfered and intimidated him with 
respect to his housing rights in violation of § 3617.  The Plaintiff claimed that after he exercised his right to 
rent an apartment free of racial discrimination, his neighbor attempted to frighten him by firebombing his 
vehicle and conducting other acts of violence and property damage against the Plaintiff and his family.133  The 
Court permitted a § 3617 claim independent of other FHA provisions, explaining that reading a § 3617 claim 
as dependent on a violation of enumerated sections would render § 3617 superfluous.134  Furthermore, the 
court reasoned that the statute itself indicated that a violation of § 3617 could be brought absent a violation of 
§§ 3603-3606.135  
                                                
125 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2011).  
126 Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir. 1994).  
127  Id.  See also Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 209-10 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding claim alleging 
firebombing Black family’s car in an effort to drive them away from an all-White neighborhood fell squarely within the 
scope of § 3617).  For example, individuals who are denied access to a home because of their race would have a remedy 
under § 3604(a).  
128 Id.  See also Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1975) (Providing employees of apartment complex 
brought suit charging that employer’s decision to terminate employment on grounds they rented apartments to minorities 
violated the FHA).  
129 Compare City of Hayward, 36 F.3d at 836 (9th Cir. 1994), with Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of 
Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004), Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1994), and Sofarelli 
v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 722 (11th Cir. 1991).  
130 See Evans v. Tubbe, 657 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1981) (The plaintiff, who was Black, purchased land from the 
defendant.  Following the purchase, plaintiff alleged that the defendant erected a gate across a road, which served as the 
only access point to plaintiff’s land, thereby preventing plaintiff from reaching and using his property.  Additionally, 
plaintiff alleged that defendant gave a key to the gate to all the White people who owned property along the road, but 
refused to give plaintiff a key.  The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had threatened, intimidated, and harassed the 
plaintiff, preventing plaintiff from enjoying her property in violation of § 3617.  The court held that Plaintiff stated an 
arguably valid claim under § 3617 because a § 3604 claim was also brought challenging the plaintiff’s access to her land.).  
131 620 F. Supp. at 210.  
132Id.  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id. (finding that the two circumstances outlined by the § 100.400 (specifically that it should be unlawful to 
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person:  1) on account of the person’s having exercised or enjoyed such 
a right; and 2) on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of such a right) 
would generally occur after the enumerated rights have been exercised, and that in these cases, the enumerated rights 
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The standard set in Stackhouse has been cited with approval by several district courts within the Second 
Circuit.136  Moreover, the Second Circuit has recognized that a claim under § 3617 could involve circumstances 
beyond those contemplated or brought under §§ 3603-3606.137  The Second Circuit’s recognition of § 3617 
claims would permit NYCHA tenants to bring claims under § 3617 against NYCHA and the City of New York 
without alleging a violation of § 3604(b).  Additionally, this interpretation comports with HUD’s 
implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act in 1988.138  Section 3617’s implementing regulation § 
100.400 states that:  
 
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any 
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of that person having 
exercised or enjoyed, or on account of that person having aided or 
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right 
granted or protected by this part.139 
 
The regulation defines five types of conduct that are impermissible under § 3617.140  Though the list is not 
exhaustive, the regulation states that “threatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their enjoyment 
of a dwelling because of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin of such persons, 
or of visitors or associates of such person,” is prohibited under § 3617.141  
B. Making A § 3617 Claim 
Using § 3617 could be an effective means of combatting aggressive tactics used by the NYPD during 
vertical patrolling, as the current manner in which these patrols are conducted arguably interferes with residents’ 
ability to exercise and enjoy their fair housing rights.  In order for a plaintiff to prevail on a § 3617 claim 
involving police misconduct, a plaintiff must show that: 1) she is a member of a protected class under the FHA; 
2) she was engaged in the exercise or enjoyment of her fair housing rights as a NYCHA tenant; 3) plaintiff’s 
race and national origin motivated the defendant’s decision to implement vertical patrols and aggressive police 
                                                
would not be violated themselves.  In explaining this finding, the Court alluded to a situation in which an apartment 
building owner fires, or otherwise retaliates against, a building manager who has rented a unit to a Black person (or other 
minority) against the owner’s wishes. Even though, in this example, §§ 3603-3606 rights have not been violated, the Court 
stated that several courts have had no difficulty finding a § 3617 violation.).   
136 Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).  See, e.g., Puglisi v. Underhill 
Park Taxpayer Ass’n, 947 F. Supp. 673, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); New York ex rel Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 
1103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 833 (2d Cir. 1994).  
137 Id.  
138 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 54 Fed. Reg. 3232-3317 (proposed Jan. 
23, 1989), available at http://www.fairhousing.com/index.cfm?method=page.display&pagename=regs_52fr3232.  
139 24 C.F.R. § 100.400 (2015).  
140 Id. § 100.400(c) (“Conduct made unlawful under this section includes, but is not limited to, the following: (1) 
[c]oercing a person, either orally, in writing, or by other means, to deny or limit the benefits provided that person in 
connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling or in connection with a residential real estate-related transaction because 
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin; (2) [t]hreatening, intimidating or interfering with 
persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin 
of such persons, or of visitors or associates of such persons; (3) [t]hreatening an employee or agent with dismissal or an 
adverse employment action, or taking such adverse employment action, for any effort to assist a person seeking access to 
the sale or rental of a dwelling or seeking access to any residential real estate-related transaction, because of the race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of that person or of any person associated with that person; (4) 
[i]ntimidating or threatening any person because that person is engaging in activities designed to make other persons aware 
of, or encouraging such other persons to exercise, rights granted or protected by this part; or (5) [r]etaliating against any 
person because that person has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a proceeding under 
the Fair Housing Act.”).  
141 Id. § 100.400(c)(2).  
184                                 Dismantling Discrimination in the Stairways and Halls of NYCHA Vol. 6:2 
 
 
tactics in NYCHA buildings; and 4) when implementing this policy, the defendants coerced, threatened, 
intimidated, or interfered with the Plaintiff’s exercise or enjoyment of fair housing rights.142 
 
1. Proving That One Is A Protected Class Member Engaged In The Exercise Or 
Enjoyment Of His Or Her Fair Housing Rights 
 
Black or Latino tenants challenging the NYPD’s vertical patrol and aggressive policing practices in 
NYCHA buildings would have no difficulty in proving that they are members of a protected class. Furthermore, 
tenants in NYCHA buildings subject to discriminatory policing and vertical patrols may have several claims 
satisfying the second prong of the test.  A plaintiff may claim that the right to entertain guests143 in her 
apartment constitutes the “exercise or enjoyment” of one of her rights under the Fair Housing Act.  Although 
many NYCHA residents have complained about the NYPD’s interference with their right to entertain guests, 
plaintiffs may also claim that the NYPD interferes with their right to quiet enjoyment  and use of their 
apartment.144 
 
2. Demonstrating That The NYPD Has Interfered With The Rights Of Black 
And Latino NYCHA Tenants 
 
Proving the fourth prong—that the NYPD’s policies have interfered with the exercise of one’s right 
to entertain guests or to quiet enjoyment—would not be a difficult threshold to satisfy.  The Sixth Circuit held 
in Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service, Inc. v. Babin that to establish interference under § 3617, a plaintiff was 
not required to show a “potent force or duress,” but that interference could be triggered by “less obvious, but 
equally, illegal, practices,” such as sending threatening notes or exclusionary zoning.145 
 
Improperly stopping or arresting residents’ guests would establish an “interference” with the right to 
entertain guests.  In Davis, the Plaintiffs alleged that the “pattern and practice of police activity in NYCHA 
buildings is so aggressive and well known that some people are afraid to visit NYCHA residents.”146  Kelton 
Davis, one of the named Plaintiffs in the case, alleged that on repeated occasions police unjustifiably stopped, 
seized, questioned, searched, or arrested his friends and visitors for trespass, even though they were lawfully 
present.  As a direct result, Mr. Davis, who is confined to a wheelchair, currently receives few visits from friends 
and is largely unable to socialize.147  
 
In addition, tenants of NYCHA buildings could allege they are unable to use and enjoy their homes 
because patrols are conducted in such a consistently unlawful and discriminatory manner, that they are 
prevented from coming and going as they wish.148  Improper arrests, constant harassment, excessive force, and 
in some cases deaths resulting from over-policing during NYPD vertical patrols would likely satisfy the fourth 
                                                
142 Lachira v. Sutton, No. 3:05CV1585PCD, 2007 WL 1346913, at *18 (D. Conn. May 7, 2007).  
143 Federal law requires reasonable accommodation for guests in public housing.  HUD’s implementing regulation 
requires that public housing leases “shall” provide for “reasonable accommodation” for tenants’ guests. 24 CFR § 
966.4(d)(1)(2016).  Additionally, “the Second Circuit has held that this right is constitutional, not merely statutory: The 
Constitution protects public housing residents’ “freedom to have whomever they want[] visit their homes [. . .]” Davis v. 
City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
144 There is an implied covenant of “quiet enjoyment” in every lease.  See Mack v. Patchin 42 N.Y. 167, 171 (N.Y. 
1870) (holding as a general rule in New York State that a covenant for quiet enjoyment is implied in every mutual contract 
for leasing and devising of land).  
145 Michigan Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Sofarelli v. Pinellas 
Cnty., 931 F.2d 718 (11th Cir. 1991)); United States v. City of Birmingham, 727 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984)).  
146 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 4.  
147 Id. at 13–14.  
148 Id. at 56.  
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prong under § 3617 for a claim that the NYPD has interfered with the right to quiet enjoyment and use of one’s 
home.  
 
3. Proving Intent To Discriminate 
 
A plaintiff may bring a claim under a disparate treatment theory of liability (also referred to as 
intentional discrimination) to satisfy the third factor.149  As direct evidence of discriminatory intent is often not 
available, a plaintiff may provide circumstantial evidence to support a finding of intentional discrimination.  In 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (“Arlington Heights”), the United States Supreme 
Court set forth a number of factors to consider in the absence of direct evidence of intent.150  Under what has 
become known as the “Arlington Heights factors,” intentional discrimination can be inferred through the 
following: 1) the impact of the challenged action, whether it bears more heavily on one race than another; 2) 
the historical background of the decision, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious 
purposes; 3) the specific sequence of events leading up to the decision; 4) any procedural and substantive 
departures from the norm; and 5) the legislative or administrative history of the decision, especially where there 
are contemporary statements made by members of the decision-making body, minutes of its meetings, or 
reports.151 
 
The Court in Arlington Heights indicated that not every factor must be proven to support a case of 
intentional discrimination.  In fact, courts have routinely upheld intentional discrimination claims where 
plaintiffs have offered evidence satisfying only a few factors.152  If a court finds that a plaintiff has provided 
sufficient proof showing that a racially discriminatory purpose, in part, motivated the policy behind vertical 
patrols and policing more generally, the policy is not automatically invalidated.153  The burden would then shift 
to the City of New York or NYCHA to establish that the same decision would have resulted even if race had 
not been considered.154  
 
As mentioned above, direct proof of discriminatory intent is rarely available.  Thus evidence showing 
that the NYPD’s practice of vertical patrolling and aggressive police tactics bear more heavily on Blacks and 
Latinos may provide an important starting point.155  Evidence supporting such a claim typically involves 
statistical data showing a disproportionate impact.156  For example, in Jim Sowell Constitutional Co., Inc. v. City of 
                                                
149 Though the United States Supreme Court has not yet determined whether disparate impact theory applies 
under the FHA, all circuit courts that have addressed this issue have determined that plaintiffs may bring claims under a 
disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) and disparate impact theory under the FHA.  See, e.g., Huntington Branch 
NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1998), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam); Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290-91 (7th Cir. 1977); Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton 
Cnty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006).  However, under an independent § 3617 claim, a disparate impact claim would 
likely be unsuccessful.  It is unlikely that a party can innocently and unintentionally “coerce, intimidate, threaten, or 
interfere with” a person’s rights protected by §§ 3603-3606.  Thus, for the purposes of proving intent under § 3617, this 
section will rely on a claim made under a disparate treatment theory.  The Seventh Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have 
explicitly held that “a showing of intentional discrimination is an essential element of a § 3617.”  East-Miller v. Lake Cty. 
Highway Dep’t, 421 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2005).  See, e.g., Sofarelli v. Pinellas County, 931 F.2d 718, 721-23 (11th Cir. 
1991); Simoes v. Wintermere Pointe Homeowners Assoc., Inc., No. 6:08-CV-01384-LSC, 2009 WL 2216781, at *6 (M.D. 
Fla. July 22, 2009), aff’d, 375 F. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2010).   
150 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).  
151 Id. 
152 See Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 867 F. Supp. 2d 920 (N.D. Ohio 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 734 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding intentional discrimination claim after plaintiff was able to provide 
circumstantial evidence showing disparate impact, a deviation from procedural and substantive practices, and racially 
charged conduct on the part of city officials).  
153 See Vill. of Arlington Heights., 429 U.S at 271 n.21.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 266.  
156 MHANY Mgmt. Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Garden City, 985 F. Supp. 2d 390, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, No. 14-
1634-CV L, 2016 WL 1128424 (2d Cir. 2016).  
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Coppell, the court found that expert testimony demonstrating that African American families were much more 
likely to reside in apartment complexes than Caucasian families was sufficient to demonstrate that rezoning 
tracts of land from multifamily to single family use and decreasing the number of apartment available to new 
residents, statistically had a greater adverse impact on African American families than on Caucasian 
families.157  Black and Latino families are more likely to live in NYCHA buildings than Caucasian families.  As 
demonstrated in Jim Sowell, this evidence is likely to illustrate that vertical patrolling and over-policing in 
NYCHA buildings has a statistically greater adverse impact on Black and Latino families than on Caucasian 
families.   
 
Furthermore, in Davis, the Plaintiffs’ expert set forth statistical data establishing that the NYPD’s 
practice more adversely impacted Blacks and Latinos.158  The data revealed that citywide, Blacks and Latinos 
represented over eighty percent of all persons stopped, and over ninety percent of all persons stopped in 
NYCHA buildings.159  The expert also found that race and ethnicity played a significant role in the rate of 
trespass stops and arrests in public housing, even after controlling for other policy-relevant factors, crime 
conditions, patrol strength, and socio-economic conditions.160  
 
Though residents of NYCHA buildings are primarily people of color, NYCHA residents are not 
exclusively minorities. 161   The legacy of racial steering and other discriminatory practices in NYCHA 
buildings162 have left many buildings racially segregated, and as a result, White residents tend to be clustered in 
some of the more desirable buildings.163  In the early 1990s, the United States and a class of plaintiffs brought 
parallel actions alleging that NYCHA discriminated in violation of, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 
and the Fair Housing Act, by assigning applicants for public housing to particular housing projects on the basis 
of race.164  In urging the district court to accept the ultimate settlement, NYCHA admitted to engaging in a 
number of policies and practices including racial steering that had effectively discriminated against Black and 
Latino applicants.165  Years later, in a suit against NYCHA, Latino and Black individuals residing in eligible 
public housing challenged NYCHA’s implementation of a preference for working-families, which the court 
ultimately found to significantly perpetuate segregation at various NYCHA developments.166  NYCHA was 
also found to be responsible for promoting racial quotas in the Williamsburg area of Brooklyn, New York.167  
Comparative data may show a difference between policing in majority-White NYCHA buildings and buildings 
predominately comprised of Black and Latino residents, which would further strengthen a claim that NYPD’s 
policy more adversely impacts people of color.168 
 
Though no current research has been conducted on this question, demographics may indicate that the 
NYPD’s policy is less likely to impact White NYCHA residents.  Not only do Whites make up a small 
                                                
157 Jim Sowell Const. Co., Inc. v. City of Coppell, 61 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547 (N.D. Tex. 1999).  
158 Fagan Declaration, supra note 11, at 2.  
159 Id.  
160 Id.  
161 In 2008, ninety-one percent of public housing residents were African American or Latino, and only 4.3 percent 
were White.  Jeffrey Fagan, Garth Davies & Adam Carlis, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 697, 702 (2012) (citing NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2008 (2009)).  
162 Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 278 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2000).  
163 Fagan, Davies & Carlis, supra note 161, at 702.  
164 See generally Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 1992 WL 420923 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).  
165 Id.  
166 Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 166 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999).  
167 Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 439 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding 
that NYCHA used a rigid quota by renting 75 percent of units to Whites, 20 percent to Hispanics, and five percent to 
Blacks, and finding that when defendants deviated from the quota, or otherwise cooperated more fully with one group, 
they did so in favor of Whites).  
168 See id.  
2016 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 187 
 
percentage of NYCHA residents, the White NYCHA population contains a disproportionately high number 
of individuals over the age of 62, a population that is generally not targeted during a vertical patrol and less 
likely to be in common areas of the building where many of the arrests and interactions take place.169  
Furthermore, because the use of vertical patrols is not implemented uniformly, but largely based on the 
discretion of the NYPD,170 it may be that many White NYCHA residents are not impacted by the policy.171 
 
Additionally, the expert in Davis found that racial disparities in trespass and total police enforcement 
increased with the magnitude of the differences in racial composition between NYCHA properties and 
surrounding neighborhoods, after controlling for local crime conditions, policing activity, population size, and 
socioeconomic and demographic composition of NYCHA sites and surrounding areas.172  Essentially, when 
predominately minority NYCHA residences are located in White or gentrifying neighborhoods, the racial 
disparities in trespass arrest rates increase even further.173  Despite being located in the same vicinity as White 
residents, this data demonstrates that Blacks and Latinos in NYCHA buildings are still more adversely impacted 
by the NYPD’s over-policing policies than their White neighbors. 
 
The historical background of the NYPD’s decision to implement vertical patrolling and over-policing 
in NYCHA buildings may serve as another evidentiary source for an Arlington Heights analysis.  This type of 
evidence would be particularly useful if it can demonstrate or reveal that a series of official actions were taken 
for invidious purposes.174  For example, any historical background from the period when OSH and vertical 
patrols were first implemented in NYCHA buildings that indicate that patrols were racially biased may be strong 
evidence under this factor.  
 
Additionally, a plaintiff may also point to the legacy of racial segregation and discrimination in NYCHA 
buildings as evidentiary support for proving intentional discrimination.  In Davis v. NYCHA, class plaintiffs 
alleged that NYCHA had engaged in discrimination in violation of a number of statutes, including the Fair 
Housing Act, by assigning applicants for public housing to particular housing projects on the basis of race.175  
NYCHA ultimately acknowledged its racially discriminatory practices and conceded that it had engaged in racial 
steering, among other things.176  Similarly, in Williamsburg Fair Housing Committee v. New York City Housing 
Authority, members of the Black, Puerto Rican, and other Latino communities living within the Williamsburg 
area of Brooklyn, New York brought suit.177  The plaintiffs alleged that NYCHA had used racial quotas to 
allocate publicly assisted housing units at various housing projects within the Williamsburg area.178 
 
 For example, one privately owned housing development, Bedford Gardens, was rented out under a 
quota that called for each building to be comprised of seventy-five percent Whites, twenty percent Latinos, and 
                                                
169 Id.  
170 Id.  In the NYPD’s 2005 Patrol Guide, under § 212-59, the guide grants the commanding officer discretion to 
determine and maintain lists of potential vertical patrol locations, and to update this list as necessary.  No further 
specifications were listed with regards to the criteria for determining potential vertical patrol locations.  See New York City 
Police Department Patrol Guide § 212-59, NYPD (2005).  The current Patrol Guide omits this section, but does not specify 
an individual responsible for determining locations nor any criteria for determining what buildings vertical patrols are 
conducted in.  See New York City Police Department Patrol Guide § 212-59, 212-60, NYPD (2013).  
171 Fagan, Davies & Carlis, supra note 161, at 702.  
172 Fagan Declaration, supra note 11, at 3.  
173 Davis Complaint, supra note 37, at 3.  
174 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977).  
175 Davis v. New York City Hous. Auth., 278 F.3d 64 (2nd Cir. 2002).  
176 Id. at 66.  
177 439 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  
178 Id.  
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five percent Blacks.179  NYCHA leased apartments from Bedford Gardens under the § 23 leasing program,180 
and had a prepared list of NYCHA apartments in the development, along with the designated ethnicity of each 
apartment unit.181  The Plaintiffs presented evidence that NYCHA rented according to these designations of 
ethnicity, and ultimately NYCHA agreed to a consent decree to end the quotas and adjust the racial and ethnic 
distribution of its buildings.182  Lastly, in Floyd, the court found that the NYPD had engaged in a policy and 
practice of stop-and-frisks that was racially discriminatory against minorities living in New York City.183  All 
three of these cases illustrate various policies implemented to discriminate against minorities both in access to 
NYCHA buildings and across New York City.  Furthermore, these cases illustrate how race has historically 
played a role in the decision making of NYCHA, the NYPD, and the City of New York.  
 
A plaintiff may provide evidence of the third Arlington Heights factor using specific antecedent events 
leading up to implementation of the vertical policing policy in NYCHA.  The Supreme Court has explicitly 
distinguished between the “historical background” of a decision and the “specific antecedent events” leading 
up to it, indicating that the latter is a separate factor to examine under the Arlington Heights analysis.184  In 
addition, departures from the normal procedural and substantive sequence may also indicate that improper 
purposes are playing a role in the decision to implement aggressive police tactics in NYCHA buildings and 
would satisfy the fourth Arlington Heights factor.185  Atypical meetings conducted to discuss implementation of 
vertical patrolling in NYCHA buildings, or a rush to implement the policy in violation of procedures, would be 
circumstantial evidence supporting a claim of intentional discrimination under this factor.186 
 
 For example, in Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, Ohio,187 the Plaintiff, an owner of an apartment 
complex occupied by an independent living program for at-risk youth (and had eighty percent African American 
clientele), presented evidence that the apartment’s unannounced visits from both police and fire inspectors 
deviated from the City’s typical procedure of notifying individuals in advance.  The district court found this to 
be compelling evidence of a substantive and procedural deviation that could support the claim that the City 
had intentionally discriminated against the apartment building residents.188  Differences in rates of stops and 
arrests between minority-occupied NYCHA buildings located in White neighborhoods, and the White 
neighborhoods that surround them, may indicate that the NYPD is policing communities differently based on 
race.  Like the case made in Hidden Village, a plaintiff may point to this procedural departure as an indication of 
intentional discrimination.  Additionally, evidence revealing that predominately White NYCHA buildings are 
policed differently may also be admissible under this Arlington Heights factor.  
 
Lastly, “the legislative or administrative history may also be highly relevant in proving intentional 
discrimination, especially where there are contemporary statements made by members of the decision making 
body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.”189  Finding statements, notes, or minutes that demonstrate intent to 
discriminate could be difficult to obtain.  Furthermore, obtaining testimony from individual officials may be 
even more difficult.  Though legislative members might be individually questioned concerning the intent of 
                                                
179 Id. at 1230.  
180 Under § 23, “leased housing” refers to dwelling units whose tenants receive the benefit of rental subsidies 
pursuant to § 103(a) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 672, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 
(2000).  
181 Williamsburg, 439 F. Supp. at 1232.  
182 Williamsburg Fair Hous. Comm. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 450 F. Supp. 602, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).  
183 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  See supra text accompanying notes 50–58.  
184 MHANY Mgmt Inc. v. Inc. Vill. of Garden City, 985 F. Supp. 2d 390, 415 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Vill. of 
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 318 (1977)).  
185 Id.  
186 Id. at 415 (citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373–76 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233, 250 (1936)).  
187 867 F. Supp. 2d 920, 944 (N.D. Ohio 2012).  
188 Id.  
189 Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.  
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vertical patrols, the Supreme Court noted in Arlington Heights, “even then such testimony frequently will be 
barred by privilege.”190  Notwithstanding evidentiary restrictions, a plaintiff may also be limited by legislative 
immunity,191 the police “code of silence,” and possible clandestine actions by members of the decision making 
process.  
 
Recently, former Mayor of New York City, Michael Bloomberg, made a series of comments affirming 
the dispatch of more police in minority neighborhoods, contending that “[ninety-five] percent of murders” in 
New York can be attributed to minorities.192  Without much more, such statements would likely not be given 
much weight by a court under an Arlington Heights analysis.  Racially charged individual comments or general 
statements made by individuals involved in the decision making process are generally given little weight when 
ascertaining intent from the entire legislative body.193  However, courts have found that thinly veiled statements 
(consistent with many of the comments made by Bloomberg) of prejudice made by several city officials can be 
compelling evidence of discriminatory intent, when viewed as a whole.194 
 
Actions or omissions on behalf of decision makers may also be indicative of discriminatory intent.  In 
Inclusive Communities Project v. Town of Flower Mound, Texas, a district court found that evidence a town manager 
who agreed to submit a proposal for affordable housing to the town council failed to do so could be sufficient 
for a reasonable jury to find that race was a significant factor in the town’s decision not to respond to the 
plaintiff’s request for affordable housing.195  In proving racial intent, a plaintiff may present evidence of the 
NYPD’s failure to act on the published reports it received from the NY CCRB, which documents the influx of 
complaints regarding improper stops and arrests.  Although minor changes were made to the patrol guide 
following notice, vertical patrolling and aggressive tactics persisted and the CCRB later reported an increase in 
the substantiation rate of complaints.  
 
The mere fact that the problem persisted following notice may be evidence upon which a reasonable 
fact finder may find that race was an important factor motivating how vertical patrolling and other policing 
tactics in NYCHA buildings were conducted.  Additionally, any complaints that contained specific racial 
statements made by officers during vertical patrols or policing may also serve as circumstantial evidence of 
discriminatory intent.  During the discovery phase of litigation, a plaintiff may be able to find additional 
                                                
190 Id.  
191 See Buonauro v. City of Berwyn, No. 08 C 6687, 2011 WL 116870, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2011) (finding 
that plaintiffs were not entitled to inquire into deliberations, thoughts, or motives of the Mayor or City Council members, 
and that testimonial privilege protected these persons from responding to deposition questions).  
192 See Karl Herchenroeder, Michael Bloomberg blocks footage of Aspen Institute appearance, THE ASPEN TIMES (Feb. 
13, 2015), http://www.aspentimes.com/news/15037917-113/michael-bloomberg-blocks-footage-of-aspen-institute-
appearance.  Though no footage was officially released, a recording from the event has been posted on several sites.  
Numerous media outlets scrutinized Bloomberg for several of his comments.  See id.  In one part of the discussion, 
Bloomberg suggested that one way to deal with young persons of color engaged in criminal activity was for the NYPD to 
“throw them up against the wall and frisk them.”  Id.  Bloomberg’s comments seem to be relevant considering that he 
implemented the stop-and-frisk policy; however, as mentioned in the paper, comments from one individual of authority 
will generally not satisfy the last Arlington Heights factor.  
193 See Florida v. United States, 885 F. Supp. 2d 299, 354 (D.D.C. 2012) (“The purpose of a single legislator is 
normally too slim a reed upon which to rest a determination regarding the legislator as a whole.”) (citing Castaneda-
Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F. 2d 417, 424 (D.C.C. 1977)).  
194 See, e.g., Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 49–51 (2d Cir. 2002).  
195 Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Town of Flower Mound, No. 8-CV-433, 2010 WL 2635292 (E.D. Tex. June 4, 
2010) (Plaintiff challenged the Town of Flower Mound’s refusal to participate in their low-incoming housing programs 
and refusal to identify property where the Town would support the location of Low Income Housing Tax Credit eligible 
multi-family housing units.  The Plaintiff contended that the town undertook such conduct as part of a strategy to prevent 
the development of low-income housing in Flower Mound for the purpose of excluding racial minorities from residing 
there.).  
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evidence of intent by examining NYPD and NYCHA board materials, minutes of meetings, and other public 
records.196 
 
The foregoing discussion identifies the Arlington Heights factors and potential subjects of inquiry that 
may be useful for proving that racial discriminatory intent existed with respect to the implementation of vertical 
patrols and over-policing in NYCHA buildings.  Within this framework, challenging vertical patrolling and the 
NYPD’s stop-and-frisk tactics in NYCHA under § 3617 has much utility and may be used as an alternative 
theory to § 3604(b) claims.  Section 3617 utilizes much broader language than § 3604(b) and may prove to be 
more effective in circumstances where a court refuses to apply § 3604(b) to a “post-acquisition claim.”  
Additionally, a plaintiff may name the NYPD, NYCHA, or the City of New York as defendants under the 
FHA.  
C. New York State Human Rights Law And New York City Human Rights Law  
1. New York State Human Rights Law  
 
A plaintiff may also bring a claim under the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), the 
primary anti-discrimination statute under New York State Law.197  New York was the first state in the nation 
to enact a Human Rights Law that prohibits discrimination in employment, housing, credit, places of public 
accommodations, or non-sectarian educational institutions based on age, race, national origin, sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status, disability, military status, and other specified classes.198  
 
Under the NYSHRL, a Black or Latino tenant may bring a claim if he or she can prove housing 
discrimination on the basis of race or national origin “in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection 
therewith.”199  Additionally, the NYSHRL has a specific provision which makes it illegal to discriminate on the 
basis of race in the terms, conditions, or privileges of publicly-assisted housing accommodations, or in the 
furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith.200  NYCHA public housing units fall within the 
NYSHRL’s definition of “publicly-assisted housing accommodation.”201 
 
Under § 296 of the NYSHRL, “the owner, lessee, sub-lessee, assignee, or managing agent of, or other 
person having the right to sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation, constructed or to be constructed or any 
agent or employee thereof” is liable for violating the statute.202  Consequently, a tenant would only have a legally 
cognizable claim against NYCHA as the owner of the tenant’s apartment.  Since the City of New York does 
not have apparent authority to lease or manage NYCHA units, it would not be a proper defendant under this 
NYSHRL provision.  A tenant may allege that through NYCHA’s agreement with the NYPD, NYCHA has 





                                                
196 Vill. of Arlington Heights. v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977). (Court permitted to question 
board members during discovery phase and trial about board materials and other available information at the time of its 
challenged decision).  
197 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §290 et seq. (McKinney 2000).  
198  Mission Statement, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.dhr.ny.gov/mission-
statement. 
199 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §290 et seq. (McKinney 2000).  
200 Id.  
201 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §292(11)(a) (McKinney 2000) (“The term ‘publicly-assisted housing accommodations’ 
shall include all housing accommodations within the state of New York in (a) public housing.”).  
202 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §292(5)(a) (McKinney 2000).  
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2. New York City Human Rights Law  
 
A plaintiff may also bring a claim under the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).  New 
York City’s human rights law is one of the most comprehensive civil rights laws in the nation.203   The 
NYCHRL204 prohibits discrimination in employment, housing and public accommodations based on race, 
color, creed, age, national origin, alienage or citizenship status, gender sexual orientation, disability, marital 
status, and partnership status.205  Additionally, in the context of housing, the City Human Rights Law affords 
additional protections based on lawful occupation, family status, and any lawful source of income.206  
 
Under the NYCHRL, violations concerning these provisions may be filed with the Human Rights 
Commission; however, the NYCHRL also grants individuals a private right of action.207  Also, successful 
complainants are entitled to an award of attorney fees.208  Challenging the NYPD’s practice of vertical patrols 
and aggressive policing in NYCHA buildings under the NYCHRL has great utility.  In 2005, the New York 
City Council enacted the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act (the “Restoration Act”) as a means of expanding 
the scope of the NYCHRL, which the council believed “had been construed too narrowly to ensure protection 
of the civil rights of all persons covered by the law.”209  “The Restoration Act provides that similarly worded 
federal and state civil laws are a floor below which the NYCHRL cannot fall, rather than a ceiling above which 
the local law cannot rise.”210  The Restoration Act asserts that the provisions of NYCHRL “shall be construed 
liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether 
federal or New York State civil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded 
to provisions of this title, have been so construed.”211  
 
3. Aiding And Abetting Liability  
 
Like the NYSHRL, the NYCHRL limits liability to an owner of a tenant’s apartment.  However, both 
statutes contain provisions specifying that, “it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid 
[or] abet […] the doing of any acts forbidden under this chapter, or to attempt to do so.”212  Persons may sue 
the City of New York under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL for aiding and abetting discrimination against 
NYCHA tenants in the furnishing of police services.213  Since both statutes contain similar language regarding 
liability, courts apply the same standard when analyzing claims under these two provisions.214 
 
A tenant must first prove a violation of the NYSHRL or NYCHRL against NYCHA, before he or she 
can make an aiding or abetting claim against the City of New York.215  To prove a claim against NYCHA, a 
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tenant is required to satisfy the same elements necessary to bring a claim under the FHA.216  However, tenants 
may bring either a NYSHRL or NYCHRL claim under a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory of 
liability.217  The NYSHRL and NYCHRL’s embrace of the disparate impact theory is especially crucial given 
the United States Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari.218 
 
After establishing a violation under NYCHA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the other defendants 
in question “actually participated in the conduct giving rise to the discrimination claim.”219  Proving that the 
NYPD participated in vertical patrolling and over-policed NYCHA buildings would not be difficult because 
the NYPD has conducted the actual conduct giving rise to the claim.  
 
V. CONCLUSION  
 
The Fair Housing Act, New York State Human Rights Law, and New York City Human Rights Law 
provide useful and powerful legal tools in dismantling housing discrimination at a national, statewide, and local 
level, but the battle is not over.  The legacy of housing segregation and discrimination has permitted the 
evolution of racialized policing.  Also, where one lives can often determine how they are policed.  The 
discriminatory and aggressive tactics used in public housing are not unique to New York City.  Cities and towns 
across the nation have implemented similar programs in public housing and communities of color.  As we 
continue the fight against housing discrimination, these remedies may serve as a useful way to not only challenge 
overt and covert forms of housing discrimination, but the racialized policing that often comes along with the 
racially segregated landscape that housing discrimination has produced. 
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